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I. SWISS NEUTRALITY
A. BASIC CONDITIONS AND CHARACTERISTICS OF SWISS
NEUTRALITY
Switzerland has practiced neutrality since the sixteenth century,
interrupted only during the Napoleonic wars between 1798 and
1815.' The growth of Swiss neutrality can be attributed mainly to
* Professor of Law Emeritus, University of Zurich.
1. The most comprehensive history of Swiss neutrality was written by EDGAR
BONJOUR, GESCHICHTE DER SCHWEIZERISCHEN NEUTRALITAT (1965-1976). See
AM. U. INTL L. REv.
two factors, one external and one internal. Switzerland's geographic
situation, buffered between mightier states often at war with each
other, was the first. Since European transit ways passed through
Switzerland's borders, its territory was of strategic importance.
Neighboring states would not have tolerated an antagonistic power's
dominance of Switzerland, but they accepted Swiss neutrality pro-
vided that Switzerland defended each state against any attempt at
foreign domination. Neutrality, for Switzerland, was thus a condition
of its independence, while for the European states it was a stabilizing
element in the European balance of power. In 1815, the states as-
sembled at the Vienna Congress, at Switzerland's request, formally
recognized Swiss neutrality stating that it was "in the true interest of
the whole of Europe."2 Swiss neutrality enjoyed its highest esteem in
the second half of the nineteenth century. In this period, permanently
neutral states were considered to be islands of peace, entrusted with
special functions by the international community. The Swiss gov-
ernment took many initiatives such as holding international confer-
ences in Switzerland, advocating the adoption of international con-
ventions, and encouraging the creation of international organizations
establishing their headquarters in its territory to meet these expecta-
tions. In the same period, humanitarian activities began to play a
prominent role. The Red Cross was founded in Geneva in 1863, and
the first Geneva Convention concluded in 1864.
The second factor that contributed to the formation of Swiss neu-
trality was the internal structure of Switzerland. Switzerland for
many centuries formed a loose conglomerate of small communities,
each of which was eager to maintain its autonomy. The alliance trea-
ties concluded between them had the sole purpose of protecting their
independence and democratic self-government against foreign rule.
They preferred their autonomy to the creation of a larger and more
powerful state. Neutrality became a shield behind which each canton
and Switzerland as a whole could cultivate its internal way of life
without being disturbed by international affairs. In the sixteenth
century, when the Reformation split Switzerland into Protestant and
also EDGAR BONJOUR, SWISS NEUTRALITY (1946) (providing a short English lan-
guage survey).




Catholic cantons, neutrality became even more a necessity for sur-
vival. If some of the cantons had followed the call to assist their fel-
low believers in other countries during the European Religious Wars,
Switzerland would have fallen apart. The fact that Switzerland is
composed of German, French, and Italian speaking cantons added
another justification for neutrality, especially in view of wars be-
tween Germany and France. All the values of Swiss political life,
such as individual freedom, democratic self-government, and peace-
ful coexistence of different religious and linguistic groups, were re-
alized on the basis of a policy of neutrality in foreign affairs. A
strong army served to defend these achievements against foreign en-
croachments. Neutrality and armed defense thereby became almost
synonymous terms.
This understanding of neutrality was particularly strong during the
period of Nazi and Communist totalitarianism. When the Western
European powers receded before Hitler's aggressive policy in the
1930s and accepted acts such as the illegal occupation of the Rhine-
land (1936) and the annexation of the Czech Sudetenland (1938),
Switzerland considered its neutrality a kind of bulwark of freedom
and democracy against totalitarianism. It vigorously reacted to at-
tempts by Germany to suppress the freedom of the press in Switzer-
land and to other actions directed against Swiss independence and
neutrality. Obviously, Switzerland acted to defend only its own ex-
istence and interests, not those of other states. As a small country,
however, that always followed a policy of non-involvement in con-
flicts of other states, it could not be expected to act otherwise. Even
today, the conviction that neutrality is a guarantee of internal free-
dom and democracy against foreign interference is still strong.
B. Swiss NEUTRALITY IN WORLD WAR II
This section will first examine whether moral considerations
should have made Switzerland relinquish its neutrality during World
War II and join the Allied war effort. Second, this paper will discuss
the question, whether Switzerland's handling of neutrality calls for
serious criticism.
As to the first question, it has been suggested that Switzerland
should have abandoned neutrality when Germany's defeat loomed on
the horizon and the danger of German retaliation had diminished.
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There is no doubt that World War II, as stated in the introduction to
this conference, differed from all previous wars due to the immensity
and horror of the atrocities committed by the Third Reich. Although
the full extent of what happened was not yet known during the war,
much of it was common knowledge, in particular, the systematic per-
secution of the Jewish population and the German misdeeds in occu-
pied territories. The Swiss people were aware of the problem of re-
maining neutral in a struggle between Western democracies and a
totalitarian regime threatening Western civilization as a whole. A
number of circumstances, however, must be considered. If Switzer-
land had been attacked by the Axis powers, it would have declared
war on the Axis and fully cooperated with the Allies. Entering the
war without being attacked, however, was politically inconceivable
for Switzerland. A sudden departure from neutrality by democratic
means was not feasible because neutrality was so deeply rooted in
the Swiss mind and considered the best way to protect freedom and
democracy. The American experience shows how difficult it is for a
democracy to declare war without being attacked. The American
declaration of war against the Axis powers became possible only af-
ter the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941.
Switzerland also refused to declare war at the end of hostilities in
order to gain admittance to the San Francisco Conference that estab-
lished the United Nations (the deadline set was March 1, 1945). Such
action would have been considered an act of sheer opportunism,
contrary to honor and morality. Moreover, Switzerland was con-
vinced that its humanitarian and diplomatic services were more help-
ful to the Allies than entering the war. Even if Switzerland had
joined the Allied war effort, it is doubtful that this would have di-
minished the extent of Nazi atrocities and the loss of human life.
Germany, whose forces encircled Switzerland, probably would have
reacted by occupying as much of Swiss territory as possible, confis-
cating all assets found in Switzerland, deporting or exterminating the
Jewish population and the Jewish refugees, stopping the protection
afforded by Switzerland as a protecting power of Allied prisoners of
war in German detention, and bringing an end to the humanitarian
assistance provided to all victims by the International Committee of
the Red Cross operating from Switzerland.
The second issue is whether Switzerland handled its neutrality im-
peccably in every respect. The most striking aspect is that Switzer-
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land, during the whole war, managed to respect the rules of the law
of neutrality, as codified in the two Hague Conventions on neutrality
of 1907, 3 with only minor exceptions.4 Switzerland based its policy
strictly on these Conventions, which constituted the only safe basis
for defending its behavior against claims of belligerents contradicting
neutrality. The emphasis put on legality gave Swiss neutrality a le-
galistic appearance. Legality, in certain cases, served to evade moral
questions. The Swiss government made some decisions that had un-
fortunate consequences even if in conformity with the law. For ex-
ample, arms trade with belligerents was legal under the law of neu-
trality provided that the arms were furnished by private enterprises,
not by the neutral state itself.' Although the distinction between state
and private trade had become blurred since most states regulated
arms trade, it still corresponded to the law in force during World War
Il. In April 1939, before the war broke out, the Swiss government
prohibited arms exports to belligerent states hoping to maintain an
incontestable moral neutrality during the War. However, it changed
its decision shortly after the outbreak of the war due to pressure from
France and Britain, which for years had neglected their armaments.
The Swiss government realized that Switzerland, devoid of any raw
materials, could not obtain goods for its survival without supplying
weapons in return. After the French defeat in 1940 and the encircle-
ment of Switzerland by the Axis powers, arms were exported mainly
to Germany. For the greater part of the War, however, Switzerland
did manage to export some goods of military importance to the Al-
lies. At the beginning of the War, the Swiss government determined
that arms could be exported only against cash payment or against
goods essential for Switzerland's survival. This principle, however,
was soon disregarded in favor of generous credits. Consequently,
3. See Hague Convention V Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral
Powers and Persons in Case of War on Land, Oct. 18. 1907, 36 Stat. 2310. 1
Bevans 654 [hereinafter Hague Convention V]; Hague Convention XIII Concern-
ing the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval War. Oct. 18, 1907. 36 Stat.
2415, 1 Bevans 723 [hereinafter Hague Convention XIII].
4. See Detlev F. Vagts, Switzerland, International Law and World War II, 91
AM. J. INT'L L. 466, 475 (1997) (concluding behavior of the Swiss Government
during World War II was in compliance with the rules of international law, in-
cluding the rules of neutrality).
5. See Hague Convention V, supra note 3, art. 7. 36 Stat. at 2323. 1 Bevans at
19981
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Germany could obtain arms on credit, even though this was incom-
patible with the law of neutrality. The certainty that arms trade was
in conformity with the law of neutrality made Swiss officials careless
with respect to the modalities and the quantity of arms exports. Al-
though Switzerland during World War II imported about five times
more weapons and other war materials from Germany for its own de-
fense-against possible German attacks!-than it exported to Ger-
many, this cannot excuse the impropriety mentioned.
Similarly, the certainty that accepting gold from the central banks
of belligerents was in conformity with neutrality made the receiving
Swiss authorities careless with respect to the true origin of the gold.
Analogous is the most tragic consequence of Swiss legalism, the
turning away of some twenty thousand Jews who were attempting to
escape from Nazism in 1942. This action was in conformity with in-
ternational law of that time, which provided a neutral state the right
to provide asylum but established no obligation. The prohibition of
refoulement-i.e., the prohibition to expel or return a refugee to ter-
ritories where his life or freedom is threatened on account of his race,
nationality, political opinion, religion, or social group-was intro-
duced by Article 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the status of
refugees only.6 Non-refoulement is now considered a norm of cus-
tomary international law and ofjus cogens. No doubt, in cases of a
mass migration of refugees there may be limits to their admission as
established by the principle of self-preservation. The Swiss practice
of 1942, however, primarily affected Jews and therefore amounted to
a measure of racial discrimination.
Another shortcoming of Switzerland was to overestimate neutral-
ity after the end of the war. The Swiss population was convinced that
armed neutrality had saved it from being dragged into the war. Al-
though Switzerland felt a deep gratitude toward the Allied forces,
which by liberating Europe had removed the threat of Nazi tyranny,
it continued to consider neutrality as the only policy guaranteeing its
independence in the future. Subsequently, Switzerland did not want
to join the United Nations as it assumed that the United Nations was
no better situated to prevent wars than the old League of Nations.
During the inter-war period, Switzerland joined the League of Na-
6. Geneva Convention of 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150.
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tions, pinning its hopes on the system of collective security estab-
lished by the League of Nations. Switzerland was bitterly disap-
pointed when the League failed due to the absence of the United
States and the appeasement policy of the Western powers toward
Nazi Germany.
This experience strongly influenced Switzerland's behavior during
and after World War. Switzerland's policy in World War II is now
under thorough examination by two commissions that consist of both
Swiss and foreign members. They are the Volcker Commission,
which is examining assets in dormant bank accounts, and the Bergier
Commission, which is examining the entire historical relationship of
Switzerland to Nazi Germany. Both commissions will present their
reports to the public.
C. Swiss NEUTRALITY SINCE WORLD WAR I
After the end of World War II, Switzerland was exposed to a type
of isolation it had never experienced before. Switzerland no longer
stood between two belligerents but in front of a closed block of vic-
torious powers making claims and subjecting Switzerland to pres-
sure. The 1946 Washington Accord on German Assets in Switzer-
land7 and on gold claims, now considered by some to be an unjust
concession by the Allies to Switzerland, was conceived as a "dic-
tate," a "capitulation," and as "deepest humiliation" in Switzerland.
The fact that the neutrals were excluded from the San Francisco Con-
ference of 1945 increased the feeling of isolation and discrimination.
Unexpectedly, however, the Cold War changed the situation.
Neutrality gained new esteem. The first sign was the armistice
agreement of 1953 ending the war in Korea.8 The parties to this war,
the United Nations being one, set up two neutral commissions: a
neutral nation's supervisory commission and a neutral nation's repa-
triation commission. Switzerland was asked to participate in both.
Furthermore, in 1955, Austria's permanent neutrality was created on
the model of Swiss neutrality and was universally recognized. Both
blocks slowly began not only to tolerate neutrality but to consider it a
useful contribution toward overcoming the East-West antagonism.
7. 13 U.T.S. 1118 (1946).
8. 47 AM. J. INT' L., Supp. 180. 186, 195 (1953).
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At the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe ("CSCE,"
now "OSCE"), a group of neutrals and nonaligned countries in which
Switzerland participated, played an important mediating role appre-
ciated by both sides. In this way, neutrality was accepted even in the
relations with a totalitarian power threatening Western civilization.
The end of the Cold War ended the privileged position of neutrals.
Switzerland, as other neutrals, was forced to adapt its neutrality to
new circumstances. The United Nations Security Council ("UNSC")
was now in a position to take action on the basis of Chapter VII of
the Charter.9 When, after Iraq's aggression toward Kuwait in 1990,
the UNSC ordered economic sanctions against Iraq, Switzerland, al-
though not a member of the United Nations, felt politically and mor-
ally compelled to take part. It was impossible to remain neutral be-
tween the international community as a whole and a single aggressor
state; particularly since the aggressor was not a neighbor state. Swit-
zerland abandoned the old doctrine that a neutral state may not break
off economic relations with one of the belligerents and maintain
them with the other. This change of policy was confirmed in all later
cases of UNSC decisions regarding economic sanctions. Neutrality
thus was reduced to its military core, i.e., to non-participation in
armed hostilities and military alliances. Furthermore, it was recog-
nized that the law of neutrality is applicable only in traditional inter-
state wars in which the UNSC has not yet made a decision to act. It is
not applicable, however, to enforcement measures decided upon by
the UNSC, even if such measures include military enforcement.
Switzerland therefore also permits forces operating under UNSC
authorization to fly over its territory, but, for political reasons, does
not itself participate in military operations.
These changes have enabled Switzerland to act more in solidarity
with the international community. There remains, however, a certain
cleavage between the government and the people. The people, who
have the final say in all important matters, hold on to neutrality as a
method of avoiding involvement in international disputes and of
protecting existing democratic institutions. For example, the voters
rejected the government's proposals to join the United Nations
(1986), to become part of the European Economic Area (1992), and
9. U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2933d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/661 (1990).
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to provide armed forces in peacekeeping operations (1994). In spite
of such restraining forces, neutrality is no longer a condition of Swiss
independence and security. Switzerland's warring neighbors are now
peaceful democratic states.
II. NEUTRALITY AND MORALITY IN THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY SINCE 1945
Since 1945, three developments have determined the relationship
between neutrality and morality in the international community. The
following three sections will examine these developments. First, the
Cold War brought about an unexpected resurrection of neutrality and
at the same time reduced the possibilities for paying attention to
moral standards. It revealed that neutrality becomes a highly es-
teemed institution as soon as a balance of power between the major
power develops. Second, after the end of the Cold War, when the
world attained a relatively high degree of unity, neutrality lost most
of its significance while more attention was given to morality. The
third development, the most important of the three, has evolved
throughout the entire period since 1945: the growing recognition of
principles of international law imposing an obligation on all states to
observe certain moral standards in all circumstances. These princi-
ples have narrowed down the freedom that the old law of neutrality
had left to the neutrals.
A. THE COLD WAR PERIOD: RESURRECTION OF NEUTRALITY,
LITTLE ATTENTION PAID TO MORALITY
At the end of World War II neutrality was widely considered ob-
solete. Charles Fenwick wrote: "The adoption of the Charter of the
United Nations on June 26, 1945, finally marked the end of neutral-
ity as a legal system."'0 When the East-West tensions mounted and
the Cold War broke out, however, neutrality came to life in new
forms, and generally not based on the traditional law of neutrality.
Nonalignment became the attitude of new states that wanted to avoid
being involved in the great power confrontation. Austria's permanent
10. See CHARLES G. FENWICK, INTERNATIONAL LAw 727 (4th ed. 1965): see
also Charles G. Fenwick, The Old Order Changeth, Yielding Place to New 47 AM.
J. INT'L L. 84, 86 (1953); Josef L. Kunz, The Laws of War, 50 AM. J. INT'L L. 313,
326 (1956).
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neutrality was also a product of the Cold War but was based on the
traditional law of neutrality. The permanent neutrality of Laos (1962)
and of Malta (1980), on the other hand, both established by interna-
tional instruments," gave expression to the principles of non-
alignment. The first generation of United Nations peacekeeping
forces, such as those established between Egypt and Israel in 1956
("UNEF I") and in the former Belgian Congo in 1960 ("ONUC"),
were conceived as neutral supervisory forces to prevent regional or
national conflicts from escalating into superpower confrontations.
They were composed of contingents of neutral or nonaligned states
but did not include forces from the five permanent members of the
UNSC. The European neutrals, particularly Austria, Sweden, and
Finland, developed an active mediating role between the two blocks,
building bridges, and assuming functions that required impartiality.
The CSCE adopted two declarations expressly recognizing the right
of states to neutrality, both in the sense of the traditional law of neu-
trality and in the sense of non-alignment. 2
Moral considerations hardly played a role in the creation and rec-
ognition of these various forms of neutrality. Neutrality was never-
theless morally justified and even welcomed because it helped over-
come tensions, partly contributing to the protection of human rights.
Neither did moral considerations play a major role in the behavior of
the two rival blocks. The Western powers obviously fought for indi-
vidual freedom, human rights, and democratic self-government. But
in an international community that was ideologically divided and had
no central bodies to enforce human rights since the UNSC was un-
able to act, moral considerations were not always given precedence
over strategic and political interests. If it seemed to be in the strategic
or economic interest of Western powers, they even supported re-
gimes that grossly violated human rights. Some cases of genocide
occurred without any notable reaction in the Western world. None-
theless, the Western powers, by upholding the values of Western
11. See Laos: Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos and Protocol to the Decla-
ration, 47, 1962, DEP'T ST. BULL., 259 (1962); Malta: Agreement on Neutrality of
Malta, 21 I.L.M. 396 (1982).
12. See Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Final Act, Aug. 1,
1975, 14 I.L.M. 1292; Concluding Document of the Madrid Session, Nov. II,
1983, 22 I.L.M. 1389.
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civilization in their own sphere and, as far as possible, outside it,
succeeded in slowly overcoming the totalitarian threat.
Since 1945, the law of neutrality has no longer been applied apart
from a few exceptions.13 This is due, first, to Article 51 of the United
Nations Charter, which recognized the right of collective self-
defense and allowed states to assist the victim of an armed attack by
lending him military or nonmilitary assistance as long as the UNSC
has not made a decision on measures to be undertaken." The United
Nations Charter thereby abrogated the obligation of states not par-
ticipating in an armed conflict to observe the law of neutrality. States
therefore freely supplied belligerents with war materials, most obvi-
ously so in the wars between the Arab states and Israel, the Vietnam
War, and the Iran-Iraq war. In so doing, not too much attention was
paid to the question of which party was the aggressor and which one
the victim of aggression. A further reason for not applying the law of
neutrality is that armed conflicts fought since 1945 have generally
not been "wars," the existence of a state war being considered a con-
dition of the applicability of the law of neutrality. Moreover, the
majority of armed conflicts have been internal conflicts to which the
law of neutrality has never been applicable. It was, however, gener-
ally admitted that states, by their own decision, might apply the old
law of neutrality if the UNSC fails to act.
Neutrality did, however, gain universal recognition beyond the pe-
riod of the Cold War in the field of humanitarian activities. The rules
of international humanitarian law must be applied "without any ad-
verse distinction based on the nature or origin of the armed conflict
or the causes espoused by or attributed to the Parties to the con-
flict." 5 The nationals of an aggressor state and of the state victim of
aggression must be treated without distinction. This is an established
principle of international law. The first Geneva Convention of 1864
13. See Dietrich Schindler, Transformations in the Law of Neutrality Since
1945, in HUMANITARIAN LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 368 (Astrid J.M. Delissen &
Gerard J. Tanja eds., 1991).
14. Cf 2 L. OPPENHEIM & H. LAUTERPACHT. INTERNATIONAL LAW 651 (7th
ed. 1955).
15. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949. Relat-
ing to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 1). Aug.
15, 1977, preamble, para. 5, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, 3-608. 16 I.L.M. 1391, 1391-442.
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stated that wounded and sick combatants "to whatever nation they
may belong" (Art. 6) must be treated equally. 6 A country's own na-
tionals may not be given preferential treatment over enemy nationals.
The "principles of humanity, neutrality and impartiality" are also
confirmed by the resolutions of the United Nations General Assem-
bly on humanitarian assistance.'7 Similarly, neutrality is a necessary
prerequisite of all functions of mediation, conciliation, arbitration,
supervision and control. In all of these situations, neutrality incon-
testably serves moral values. In these cases neutrality is applicable
not only in war and not only by states and to states, but at any time
and by all actors engaged in such functions.
B. THE PERIOD FOLLOWING THE END OF THE COLD WAR: FADING
OF NEUTRALITY, MORE ATTENTION PAID TO MORALITY
The situation of neutrality quickly changed after the end of the
Cold War. Neutrality was fading away when the Warsaw Pact and
the Soviet Union were dissolved in 1991 and the international com-
munity attained a higher degree of unity. Nonalignment became an
almost meaningless term, the group of neutrals and nonaligned
countries in the CSCE ceased to exist, and the European neutrals re-
duced their neutrality to its military core, i.e., non-participation in
military alliances and non-admission of foreign military bases on
their territory. They abandoned the practice of equal treatment in
economic matters. This enabled them (with the exception of Swit-
16. Geneva Convention of 1864, reprinted in DIETRICH SCHINDER & JIRI
TOMAN, THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS 279, 280 (3d. ed. 1988).
17. See Humanitarian Assistance to Victims of Natural Disasters and Similar
Emergency Situations, U.N. GAOR, 43d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/Res/43/131 (1989);
Strengthening of the Coordination of Humanitarian Emergency Assistance of the
United Nations Resolution, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Annex I, Agenda Item 2, U.N.
Doc. AIRes/47/68 (1991). In international humanitarian law the principle of neu-
trality is distinguished from the principle of impartiality. Neutrality means not
taking sides in hostilities or engaging in controversies of a political, racial, relig-
ious, or ideological nature. Impartiality is understood as the principle not to make
discrimination as to nationality, race, religious beliefs, class or political opinions.
See Proclamation of the Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross, XXth Interna-
tional Conference of the Red Cross, Vienna, 1965, reaffirmed in Preamble of the
Statutes of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement of 1986, In
INTERNATIONAL COMMITrEE OF THE RED CROSS [ICRC] AND THE LEAGUE OF
RED CROSS AND RED CRESCENT SOCIETIES, COMPENDIUM OF REFERENCE TEXTS
ON THE INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS AND RED CRESCENT MOVEMENT (1990).
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zerland) to join the European Union, a step they had so far avoided in
view of their neutrality. The UNSC was no longer paralyzed by the
great power confrontation and became able to pay more attention to
moral values. In the many internal conflicts that have taken place in
recent years, the UNSC strongly emphasized humanitarian needs.
Regarding Iraq, the UNSC insisted that access be provided to all
those in need of assistance." The UNSC determined that the magni-
tude of a human tragedy could constitute a threat to international
peace and security, and they justify the use of all means necessary to
establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations."
Furthermore, the UNSC established two international tribunals for
the prosecution of persons responsible for serious violations of inter-
national humanitarian law in the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda.i3
C. DEVELOPMENT OF PRINCIPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
IMPOSING AN OBLIGATION ON STATES TO OBSERVE MORAL
STANDARDS
The experiences of World War II, particularly the systematic de-
nial of fundamental human rights by Nazi Germany, led to the con-
viction that all states must accept certain international standards of
morality in order to prevent a repetition of atrocities, such as those
committed before and during World War II. The United Nations
Charter gave expression to this conviction by making the guarantee
of fundamental human rights a basis of the future world order. In
seven different provisions, the United Nations Charter refers to the
necessity for respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms. In
the Cold War period, the international community adopted conven-
tions and declarations laying down more specific rules in this regard
18. See U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2982d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RESI688 (1991).
19. See U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3145th mtg., U.N. Doc. SIRES!794 (1992)
(regarding Somalia); U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3191st mtg., U.N. Doc. SIRES/816
(1993) (regarding the protection of Bosnian airspace): U.N. SCOR. 48th Sess..
3228th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/836 (1993) (regarding the protection of Bosnian
safe areas); U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess.. 3392d mtg.. U.N. Doc. S/RES1929 (1994) (re-
garding Rwanda).
20. See U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess.. 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES1827 (1993)
(establishing the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia): U.N.
SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994) (establishing the In-
ternational Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda).
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such as: the Genocide Convention of 1948,"1 the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights of 1948,22 the Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination of 1966,23 the two Interna-
tional Covenants on Human Rights of 1966,24 among other instru-
ments. The Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their Additional Proto-
cols of 1977 also form part of the instruments embodying such
rights. In the course of this development, the fundamental character
of basic human rights was emphasized by their recognition as norms
of jus cogens and obligations erga omnes. The category of jus cogens
(peremptory norms) was introduced by Articles 53 and 64 of the Vi-
enna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969.25 The category of
obligations erga omnes was established by the International Court of
Justice in its Barcelona Traction judgment of 1970.26 All the basic
principles embodied in the instruments mentioned form part of these
two categories of rights and obligations. One of the most important
achievements in this development is that human rights no longer be-
long to the internal affairs of states as they did in the World War II
period, but rather have become matters of international concern. The
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia rightly
stated: "A state-sovereignty-oriented approach has been gradually
supplanted by a human-being-oriented approach."
2 7
The recognition of fundamental human rights as norms of jus co-
gens and as obligations erga omnes has had the following effects on
neutrality:
o Neutral states, as all states, have a right to take a position
against violations of human rights occurring in other states.
They may take measures not involving the use of armed force
21. 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (1948).
22. GAOR, 3d Sess., Res. 217 A (1948).
23. 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (1966).
24. 993 U.N.T.S. 3; 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
25. U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 39/27; 8 ILM 679 (1969).
26. Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co. (Beig. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3, 32
(Feb. 5).
27. Prosecutor v. Tadic, U.N. Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Respon-
sible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the
Territory of Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, Case No. IT-94-1- AR72 (App.
Chamber 1995), reprinted in 35 I.L.M. 32 (1996).
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against such states and thereby deviate from possible obliga-
tions deriving from neutrality. They have, however, no obliga-
tion to take such measures unless the Security Council adopts
decisions to that effect.
o States may not lend assistance to other states for the commis-
sion of violations of human rights. The International Law
Commission, in its draft articles on state responsibility, stated:
"Aid or assistance by a state to another state ... rendered for
the commission of an internationally wrongful act carried out
by the latter, itself constitutes an internationally wrongful act,
even if, taken alone, such aid or assistance would not consti-
tute the breach of an international obligation."' This rule does
not imply an obligation of states to interrupt commercial rela-
tions with a belligerent violating human rights; states are only
prohibited from rendering assistance for the commission of
internationally wrongful acts. If, however, certain goods deliv-
ered to other states, such as weapons, can be used for the sup-
pression of human rights, their exportation to the respective
states should be prohibited.
o States may not recognize acts or consequences of acts com-
mitted in violation of human rights or of international hu-
manitarian law. Thus, for instance, states should prohibit the
importation of objects confiscated by other states in violation
of human rights or humanitarian law.
o Under the principle of non-refoulement states may not "expel
or return a refugee. . . to the frontiers of territories where his
life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, re-






28. See 1989 Resolution on the Protection of Human Rights and the Principle
of Non-intervention in Internal Affairs of States, in ANNUAIRE DE L'INSTITUhT DE
DROIT INTERNATIONAL, RPESOLUTIONS 1957-1991. at 207, Art. 2 & 3 (1992) (stat-
ing that states, acting individually or collectively, are entitled to take all kinds of
measures except use of force).
29. Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its 48th Ses-
sion, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 9-13, U.N. Doc. AI51/10 (1996).
30. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. July 28, 1951. art. 33. 189
U.N.T.S. 150.
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* All states, including neutrals, have the obligation to bring per-
sons having committed grave breaches of international hu-
manitarian law before their own courts regardless of their na-
tionality and the place where the breaches were committed."
Obviously, the rules listed here do not concern neutral states alone.
All states have an obligation to act in conformity with the moral
standards laid down in international law. All states therefore are
called upon to take action if atrocities such as those committed in
World War II are committed and to prevent such acts with all the
means at their disposal. Problems, such as arms trade, gold transfers,
and heirless assets, discussed in recent years with respect to the neu-
trals o World War II, are no longer problems of neutral states alone.
They concern all states and can be resolved only if all states partici-
pate in regulating them and observe the respective rules. Such rules,
unlike the old law of neutrality, should be applied not only in inter-
state wars going on between other states, but at all times; and par-
ticularly in cases of internal armed conflicts and violations of human
rights occurring in other states.
31. See Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and the Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 49, 6
U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the
Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea,
Aug. 12, 1949,, art. 50, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention Rela-
tive to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 129, 6 U.S.T. 3316,
75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Per-
sons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 146, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
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